Interesting catch by Sucuri, a website exploit that adds malicious code to the EXIF headers in legitimate images on the compromised host.
I would be more worried that someone would kill me in order to get the documents released than I would be that someone would kill me to prevent the documents from being released. Any real-world situation involves multiple adversaries, and it’s important to keep all of them in mind when designing a security system.
—Bruce Schneier, in response to Edward Snowden having a “dead man’s switch” that would release all of the documents he stole if anything happens to him.
I have a new column/blog on Dark Reading. Or, more accurately, I’ve taken over a column called Sophos Security Insights (previously SophosLabs Insights).
The first post, “Forget Standardization. Embrace BYOD.” went up today. Here’s a sneak peak:
Despite its rocky start, Windows 8 has IT departments salivating over the idea of standardizing on a single platform. It’s a compelling vision: phones, tablets, and workstations all running a single OS and managed through a shared set of native Microsoft tools. Compelling, perhaps, but for most organizations, it ain’t gonna happen.
From the “wait, what?” department:
In his letters, [New York State Attorney General] Schneiderman asked why companies such as Apple and Samsung, which develop such sophisticated devices, can’t also create technology to render stolen devices inoperable and eliminate the expanding black market.
Apart from the technical challenges, just think of the potential problems (errors, malicious hacking, etc.) that would result from our cell phones having remote-triggered self-destruct capability controlled by phone vendors. If you want to protect your phone, install security software like the free Sophos Mobile Security, which allows you to remotely locate, lock, or wipe your phone, but doesn’t render the phone itself inoperable. And if you’re that concerned about your phone being stolen, buy insurance (or, for families, self-insure by setting aside enough savings to replace one of the family’s phones in case of loss/theft).
I’m very excited to announce that, in two weeks, I will be joining the team at Sophos. The company, dual headquartered in Abingdon, UK, and Burlington, MA, creates some of the best network and endpoint security products for small and medium enterprises. Sophos was one of the first companies to join StopBadware’s partner program when it launched in 2011, and I’ve had impressively positive interactions with the people there ever since. They also have one of the most prolific and entertaining blogs in the industry.
I’ll be joining Sophos’s marketing team as a Senior Product Marketing Manager, specializing in endpoint security. I have my friend and colleague Joram Borenstein to thank for helping me realize that much of the work I’ve done at StopBadware over the past few years has been product marketing, even if I didn’t have a name for it. I’m looking forward to this foray into a new field and a new organization. I’m also glad that I’ll be able to draw on the immense amount I’ve learned about the security industry during my five and a half years at StopBadware. I’ve had the chance to work with amazing people on our staff and board, at our partner companies, and throughout the industry. I’m grateful for the opportunity I was given to lead this exciting initiative, and I look forward to remaining involved as a member of the StopBadware Board of Directors.
I’ll be spending this week wrapping things up and training my replacement at StopBadware. Next week I get to take a much needed break, and then I’ll jump into my new role at Sophos.
The FTC recently settled charges with mobile phone maker HTC, which provided highly insecure software on its Android phones:
The Commission charged that HTC America failed to employ reasonable and appropriate security practices in the design and customization of the software on its mobile devices. Among other things, the complaint alleged that HTC America failed to provide its engineering staff with adequate security training, failed to review or test the software on its mobile devices for potential security vulnerabilities, failed to follow well-known and commonly accepted secure coding practices, and failed to establish a process for receiving and addressing vulnerability reports from third parties.
I haven’t seen much written about this, but it seems like a big deal. It’s the first time I can think of that a U.S. regulatory agency has held a company accountable for failing to provide reasonable security in its products. Indeed, for many years, software and hardware vendors alike have avoided accountability. Vendors often disclaim responsibility through license agreements and/or asserting that all products have flaws, so they can’t be expected to provide perfect security. It remains to be seen whether this will be the start of a trend toward greater vendor accountability and whether this action will get other product vendors to take notice and beef up their security efforts.
Alan Paller makes a great point in a comment in today’s issue of SANS NewsBites:
Issuing a patch does NOT fix the problem. Vendor’s should not be allowed to get away with leaving major security flaws in software used in the critical national infrastructure without ensuring that (1) each buyer knows about the risk (emails haven’t changed, the right person is on the mailing list) and (2) the buyer has confirmed that he/she has the needed knowledge and support from the vendor to install the patch effectively. As an industry, we have to stop pretending that a patch release fixes a security flaw. Too often, a patch is never installed because the right person doesn’t know about it or know enough about it and no automated capability is in place to ensure the patch is installed.
The general point, that a vendor issuing a patch does not mean that the problem is solved, applies far more broadly than just critical infrastructure. Microsoft has clearly recognized this, as they have created advertising and educational campaigns to encourage users to update old versions of Internet Explorer. For all the excitement that is generated when attacks against zero day vulnerabilities occur, most malicious activity on the Internet exploits software for which patches have been available for weeks, months, or years.